Private Markets and Family Offices: Access Is No Longer the Problem

Family offices are allocating more capital to assets they cannot sell tomorrow. But access to these markets is advancing faster than the readiness to manage them well.

According to J.P. Morgan's 2026 Global Family Office Report — based on a survey of more than 300 family offices across multiple continents, including Latin America, with average assets of approximately $1 billion — approximately one third of family office portfolios is now invested in private assets: private equity, venture capital, direct lending, real estate, and infrastructure. In the United States, that proportion approaches 40%.

The leading industry reports are consistent. Depending on how it is measured, private markets and other alternative assets already represent between one third and more than half of family office portfolios globally.

The growing appetite for this type of investment is clear — something I have observed consistently through almost two decades of working with Latin American family offices. But what is changing is not just how much is being allocated. It is who can now access these assets.

Until recently, private markets were almost exclusively the territory of large institutional investors and a handful of family offices — primarily the largest ones — with minimum tickets of several million dollars and typical fee structures of 2 and 20: 2% annual management fees plus 20% of profits, a model that for decades was simply the price of entry. That model still exists, but it is changing rapidly.

Analysis from Deloitte and industry sources shows that the number of semi-liquid funds in the United States — vehicles that allow investment in private markets with periodic liquidity windows — has grown significantly in recent years, alongside the assets under their management. Major asset managers including Apollo, Blackstone, BlackRock, and KKR are creating instruments with substantially lower minimum investments, accessible through traditional custodians and with fee structures that are far more competitive than in the past.

For high-net-worth Latin American families diversifying into the United States, this changes the conversation. The question is no longer simply about gaining access to private markets — that barrier has been significantly reduced. The question is whether they have the structure to do it well: a clear investment policy, defined governance and decision-making processes, a solid liquidity plan, and a total portfolio view.

Ultimately, the real risk of increasing exposure to private markets is not illiquidity itself. It is gaining that exposure without a decision-making infrastructure in place. Allocating a third or more of a portfolio to assets that cannot be sold tomorrow demands a system that functions well over the long term. Without that system, illiquidity stops being simply a characteristic of the asset — and can become a trap.

By Lawrence Lamonica | Lamonica Advisory Group